



# Final Report

## International Fact-Finding Mission to Libya (IFML, Tripoli) 10-09-08 June, 2019

<sup>1</sup>The International Fact-Finding Mission to Libya (IFML) was followed by an official closed session at the Tunisian Parliament, in Tunis June 2019, 11, hosted by Ms. Latifa Habachi, Chair of the Committee For Freedoms and International Relations of the Tunisian National Assembly as well as a meeting with Admiral Kamel Akrouf, National Security Advisor at the Tunisian Presidency, to discuss the implications of the Libyan conflict on Tunisia.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A delegation of European politicians, academics, diplomats, and journalists took part in a fact-finding mission to Tripoli, Libya between 9 and 11 June 2019. The delegation engaged with political stakeholders at various levels, including the President of the Presidential Council, Fayez Al-Serraj, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Ghassan Salamé and the President of the High Council, Khaled Al-Machri. However, the delegation was unable to consult representatives of the Libyan National Army (LNA) located in the east of the country, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Towards this end, a similar fact-finding mission will take place in Benghazi.

Political stakeholders in Tripoli consistently expressed the view that the international community has abandoned Libya, while the LNA has abandoned the Skhirat Agreement and seeks to topple a legitimate and internationally recognised government. Our interlocutors dismissed claims that the siege of the capital by Field Marshal Haftar's forces is related to counterterrorism objectives, while the issue is often justified as the purpose of the "Tripoli Offensive" launched on April 4, 2019.

Nonetheless, the GNA government remains open to the prospect of resuming negotiations.

Between April 15 and June 5, 2019, the military frontline has remained stable and it appears that the battle for Tripoli is now at a stalemate. It is questionable whether Khalifa Haftar's forces will be able to achieve their military objectives in either Tripoli or Misrata, while the GNA government retains control of its own airport and harbour. Without foreign intervention or the build-up of massive advantage in terms of military technology by either side, the stalemate is likely to be prolonged. Out of the 600 casualties at the beginning of hostilities on April 4, 2019, approximately 50 were civilians. Though war crimes have allegedly taken place, there have been no arrests so far.

The military situation in the south of Libya is different from Tripoli, with a dynamic front across a largely uncontrolled desert region overrun by small and agile terrorist cells, often linked to resurgent Islamic State forces in the south-east and AQIM in the south-west. Because the GNA forces are now forced to prioritise the defence of the capital, the mission's political informants are of the opinion that a prolonged military standoff around the capital would allow the resurgence of terrorist activity in more areas of the country whilst unleashing human trafficking flows to Europe. Our informants regret that public opinion in Europe is exclusively focused on migration paying little attention to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Libya.

The economic life of the capital appears to be stable, as oil infrastructure remains intact and international oil prices remain stable. There is no evident shortage of commodities in the capital, prices are stable, but that is not the case behind the outer perimeter of the conflict zone. Approximately 1.2 million barrels of oil are pumped daily, accounting for about 93% of government revenue. Out of a population of 6.5 million persons, 1.8 million were on the government payroll. The devaluation of the currency has helped to stabilise the economic situation and there is a sense of business-as-usual in the city, as if there was no conflict.

The dominant perception on the ground is that LNA forces are allegedly supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, but there are also some allegations of French, US, and Russian involvement - justified by the need to counter resurgent terrorist threat - though still officially sustaining the GNA. In contrast, the GNA is overtly supported by Italy, Turkey, and Qatar. In sum, the military deadlock appears compounded by contrasting positions adopted by the international community, including members of the UN Security Council.

# Contents

Preliminary Notes ..... 6

Context and purpose of the of the IFML..... 7

Consultations’ Agenda of the International Fact -finding Mission to Libya (IFML).....13

Meetings of the IFML with Representatives of Political Parties and Libyan Municipalities .....14

ANNEX .....22

## European Interest

European Interest is an independent online news and feature publication and think tank launched by independent journalists in 2017. It covers a vast array of European matters, including politics, society and culture. However, European Interest is not a publication that approaches European matters neutrally. It is about European interests and is therefore guided by the belief that the European Union is the best way for European states to avoid violent confrontations and reach agreements that can benefit the lives of nearly 550 million citizens. Although European institutions must be under constant examination and critic, the initial aim of the EU for further integration must be continued. Our historical period is that of a huge home with diminished role of national elites. Instead, one works for the benefit of the entire European population far from national, religious and local disputes.



## Theodoros Benakis

Political Scientists and journalist. Benakis worked for the Greek General Secretariat of Press during first Greek Presidency (1984) and at the Press Office of the Embassy of Greece in Rome (1988-91). Thereafter he worked as Eastern European correspondent for the daily newspaper Kathimerini (1991-1996) across Eastern Europe and the Balkans. He went on work as media advisor for Dafne Publications and the EU Office in Athens (1996-2010) before founding The International Media Network, which published 6 weekly foreign-language newspapers. In 2017 He went on to become the managing editor of New Europe's print and online edition (Brussels) before taking on the European Interest website.



The **Institut Prospectif et Sécurité en Europe / Institute for European perspective and Security (IPSE)**, is a Paris-based think tank, created in 1988.

Boasting over 35 fellows and associates in Paris, Brussels, London, Rabat, and Geneva, IPSE provides expert analysis on international security and diplomacy. IPSE produces policy papers, consultancy notes, academic articles focusing on track two



**Institute for European  
Prospective & Security**

diplomacy policy, notably conflict mediation and facilitation across the MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Africa, the Persian Gulf, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asian regions. Created with the ambition to foster and develop an autonomous and robust ESDP, IPSE strives for the emergence of Europe as an integrated diplomatic actor.

**Emmanuel DUPUY** is the President of the Institute European Perspective & Security - IPSE ([www.institut-ipse.eu](http://www.institut-ipse.eu)), think tank. In 2011, he served as a Political advisor of the French forces in Afghanistan and is the vice-president of the France-Afghanistan Club. He has held various advisory positions in ministerial cabinets, including Defense & Veterans affairs. He is an associate Professor in Université Paris-Sud and ILERI & ISG. He specializes on war and security studies in Africa, Central Asia, Caucasus and MENA region. As a researcher, he is associated with a number of institutions, including the Université de Genève (UNIGE, Switzerland) and the Ningbo Maritime Silk Road Institute (China). He is also the International Relations Secretary of the the French Centrist Party.



**The International Centre for Relations & Diplomacy (ICRD, London)**

is an independent, not-for-profit and non-partisan think tank founded in 2017. ICRD works with national governments, international organizations, and third sector entities, primarily in Western Europe and the Middle East. Its mission is to support policy development through research and documentation, supporting non-violent conflict management. ICRD is committed to democratic governance and acts as a human rights advocacy platform.



**Sameh Habeeb** is a political consultant that has helped a number of European and international NGO's to maximize their impact and outreach. In 2017 he founded the International Centre for Relations & Diplomacy (ICRD). For over a decade, Habeeb has worked with parliamentarians, governments, academics and journalists across Europe across the Middle East and Western Europe.



In 2017, Habeeb he co-founded Newswire Now, a press release distribution service, designed to enhance media access to emerging political voices and movements in the Middle East, mitigating the perceived blackout and censorship of privately-owned corporate media. The non-for-profit platform is devoted to the service and advancement of human rights causes and any profit generated by Newswire is redeployed for the incremental development of the platform. Habeeb has also worked as Commissioning Editor for Open Democracy and has developed a reputation as a blogger and influencer on Middle East affairs, publishing with outlets such as Middle East Eye, Al Araby, Digital Journal, the Examiner, VSD Magazine, the Nations and others. As a TV producer, he has worked with BBC, CNN, CBC, CBS, Fox News, Channel 4, Sky News, Democracy Now and others, opening roads and empowering emerging voices in Middle Eastern societies. Sameh Habeeb holds a BA in English Literature and an MA in Media and Business studies.

## Preliminary Notes

The *International Fact-Finding Mission to Libya* (IFML) was organized by **two independent, non-profit and non-partisan think tanks**:

The **Institut Prospective et Sécurité en Europe** / Institute for European Perspective & Security (**IPSE**) created in 1988 and based in Paris. Its President, **Emmanuel DUPUY**, was the Mission Leader of the IFML.

The **International Centre for Relations & Diplomacy (ICRD)** is a London-based institution founded in 2017. Its Director, **Sameh HABEEB**, was the mission's Project Coordinator.

The *International Fact-Finding Mission to Libya* (IFML) brought together a wide range of geopolitical experts from European think tanks and academia, former and acting policymakers, and journalists covering MENA affairs and specifically Libya from 10 European countries: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Hungary, Denmark, Cyprus, Poland as well as Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States.

- **None of the participants represented any national or European official institutions or organisations;**
- The present report **neither represents nor reflects any specific perception or position of one of the participants on the Libyan crisis;**
- **Additional papers reflecting personal views and opinions of some of the participants to the mission are annexed to this statement ;**
- The purpose and aim of the IFML was and still is to **stand beside - above all - the Libyan people as a whole**, irrespectively of whether they reside in Tripolitania (West), Cyrenaica (East), Fezzan (South) ;
- The two associated think-tanks (IPSE & ICRD) are due to conduct **a fact-finding mission in Benghazi** (autumn 2019) motivated by their quest for an objective assessment.

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## Context and purpose of the of the IFML

Since the military offensive against Tripoli launched on April 4 by the Libyan National Army (LNA), under the command of Field Marshal **Khalifa Haftar**, against the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed since March 2016 by Prime Minister **Fayez al-Serraj** and the Presidential Council, the Libyan crisis is one of the major concerns of the international community.

Following the 2011 popular uprising in Libya against **Muammar Qaddafi**'s regime, leading to his death in October 2011, the hope for a new Libya as a result of the revolutionary process has been elusive. Instead, there has been a prolonged and seemingly endless civil war between Libyans, provoking a spillover effect that is fuelling more crises in **neighbouring countries** (Tunisia, Mali, Niger, Egypt, Chad).

According to data released by the Government of National Accord (GNA), the recent crisis has caused the death of 633 Libyans – amongst whom around 50 civilians and 583 militia fighters (from the cities of Misrata, Zintan, Warfalla & Bani Walid). The casualties were inflicted on both the side of the Government of National Accord (GNA), the LNA, as well as some elements of the Madkalisalafist movement that has a strong influence across warring factions. In addition, there are more 3,547 wounded and 91 000 displaced persons<sup>1</sup>.

Beyond this new category of IDPs, there are also 800 000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Libya, aiming to leave the country bound for Europe, crossing the Mediterranean Sea. This transit flow of migrants is a significant source of income for criminal networks that have established links with terrorists and drug -traffickers, fuelling broader instability. The cluster of these security challenges threaten to destabilise not merely Libya, but more broadly the Maghreb and Sahel regions, as well as EU member states.

The electoral process of the first democratic legislative elections of July 2012 and June 2014 provided reasonable hope for stabilisation and an inclusive political process in Libya that would end the conflict. Likewise, the two successive legislative elections under UN auspices and through an internationally validated process defined by the Skhirat (Morocco) agreement of December 17, 2015, provided additional credibility to the democratisation process. Nevertheless, since May 2014, the conflict persists.

The recent military offensive launched by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar follows his previous “*Dignity Operation*” (2014) offensive aiming the oil-rich Central Libyan coastal area, the South West and South East Fezzan region, blurring the prospect of a compromise solution.

Furthermore, the offensive undermines the political and diplomatic progress achieved through six successive meetings between GNA and LNA representatives, with the participation of the two respective parliamentary bodies: the Tripoli-based High Council of State and its President Khaled al-Mishri and the Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) and its President Aguila Salah Issah and the so-called Al-Bayda Government of Prime Minister Abdallah al-Thinni (since March 2014).<sup>2</sup> The meetings in Abu Dhabi (May 2017), Paris (July 2017), Palermo (November 2018), Paris (May 2018), Abu Dhabi (February 2019) should have

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<sup>1</sup>The figures cited are given by the GNA and reflect the military situation on the ground as of June 8, 2019.

<sup>2</sup>Until April 2019, the Benghazi-based House of Representatives was previously based in Tobruk and is sometimes referred to as the Al Bayda Government.

continued with the Ghadames summit, initially planned for April 14-16, 2019. That is now indefinitely postponed due to the current military stalemate and a political deadlock.

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The *IFML* arrived thus in Libya in this complex and uncertain context.

Its principal objective was primarily to meet the political and elected bodies, the official institutions, the political parties, Civil Society and Non-Governmental (NGOs) stakeholders, as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), **H.E. Ghassan Salamé**, located in Janzour (located 12 km west from the centre of Tripoli) in order to gather all the necessary facts and figures, allowing a better understanding of the ongoing situation.

Therefore, the agenda of the three-day mission in Tripoli reflects the permanent preoccupation of the *IFML* for its independence and testimony to its continuing mission to assess the situation as it is on the ground and not as it is sometimes described in the media from abroad.

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## Global Assessment of the mission in Tripoli

**The timing of the IFML in Tripoli was a vital element of the mission.**

Arrivals began on June 8, two months after the launching of the military offensive (April 4) against the capital of Libya, Tripoli. The *IFML* prioritised the understanding of the state of affairs in the military theatre, often described as a siege of Tripoli, home to almost 30% of the 6,2 million population of Libya.

With this objective in mind, the mission arrived in Tripoli a day after the LNA targeted a GNA Bayraktar TB2 Turkish-made UAV in the area of the Mitiga International Airport.

The majority of the combats takes place in the southern administrative outskirts of the state capital, such as in *Tarhounah* (located 92 km from the centre of Tripoli) and *Gharyan*, in the district of *Al Djabar al Gharbi*, located approximately 113 km of the centre of the capital.

The *IFML* arrived in Tripoli, just few hours before the UN 2473 Resolution was adopted by the United Nations Security Council on June 10, emphasising the necessity to pursue a years' long arms embargo, in line with UN Resolution 2292 adopted in June 14, 2016, UN Resolution 2420 adopted in June 2018 and UN Resolution 2357, adopted in June 2017.

The UN 2473 Resolution also affirmed the necessity to prolong the EUNAVFOR MED *Sophia* Operation (Decision 2015/778/PESC) launched on May 18, 2015, thereby re-engaging military vessels after its suspension in March 2019. Finally, Resolution 2473 renewed the inspection mandate for ships found off the Libyan coast in international waters until September 2019, to render effective the blockade of arms and military equipment trafficking.

It is worth noting that both sides (GNA & LNA) have been recently supplied with a vast amount of military equipment, including 30 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) BMC *Kirpi* Turkish vehicles delivered in the port of Misrata on April 2019 and the delivery of KADDB 8x8 *Al-Mared* Armoured Fighting vehicles, manufactured in Jordan, coming from the UAE to the LNA.

With a view to underscore its impartiality, the *IFML* wishes to make **16 succinct statements** that summarise its perception of the situation on the ground:

1. Although the *IFML* did not witness direct fighting - though, we must insist that a significant part of the persons composing the *IFML* (mostly journalists) asked to observe at numerous occasions the reality of the fighting on the *front line* outside of Tripoli - the **impact of the battle inside the city is a reality**, as the bombarding of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) medical storage facility or the rocket strike on Rixos Hotel, hosting GNA meetings demonstrates;
2. **Notwithstanding reservations about the perceived responsibility of European actors in the ongoing conflict in Tripoli – especially France and Italy** – the mission met with the majority of significant political stakeholders on the ground: the mayors of principal urban centres, some of whom are under the control of the LNA, the leadership of the biggest Libyan political parties, representatives of civic organizations (NGO), members of the High Council of State and its president **Khaled el-Mishri**, the head of the Presidential Council, Prime Minister **Fayez el-Serraj**, as well as the SRSG,

**Ghassan Salamé.** The mission also concluded a field trip throughout the city, which made clear that the **actual status-quo, based on a military stalemate, is untenable;**

3. On the same basis, the relative criticism targeting the SRSG and head of the United Nations Support **Mission** in Libya (UNSMIL) is **counterproductive**, as the **SRSG position carries the weight of 193 United Nations member states** and, moreover, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
4. Nonetheless, the *IFML* maintains that the **divergent positions inside the UNSC, the UN, and specific EU member states -- particularly Italy and France – seriously undermine the chances for peace and stability to prevail;**
5. Furthermore, as neither the 30<sup>th</sup> Arab League Summit in Tunis (March 31, 2019), nor the 14<sup>th</sup> Islamic Cooperation Organization (ICO) Summit held in Jeddah (June 1, 2019), nor the recent European Union Council meetings (June 20-21, 2019) or the “Two Shore Summit” gathering of the 10 Mediterranean Sea bordering countries and France (held in Marseille, June 21-22, 2019) managed to forge a consensus on Libya, **diplomacy must find the way to transcend regional grievances.** Particular attention must be put on the possibility for the diplomatic initiative in the **upcoming African Union Summit in Niamey (Niger) in July, taking into account the ongoing Congolese mediation efforts since 2017.** Thus far, the results of this initiative have been weaker than anticipated.
6. **As other “exported crisis” on the African continent** (such as Sudan), the proxy interference of the *Quartet* of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members on the one hand -Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , United Arab Emirates, Bahrein and Egypt – and, the Qatari-Turkish alliance on the other, complicate the quest for a sustainable diplomatic resolution in Libya.
7. The extensive Libyan borders with Egypt (1115 km), Chad (982 km), Algeria (459km), Tunisia (381km), Sudan (354 km), suggest that spill-over effects on regional security are more likely, and the possibility of regional mediation more necessary and possible. The international community must put diplomatic negotiations back on track. To that end, the recent joint position articulated in Tunis by the foreign ministers of Algeria (Sabri Boukadoum), Tunisia (Khemaies Jhinaoui) and Egypt (Sameh Choukri) confirms the urgency to obtain **an immediate and unconditional ceasefire;**
8. **This position is quite similar to the different statements issued by the leadership of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the European Union** (Council and European Union External Action Service - EEAS) following Prime Minister al-Serraj's tour of Rome, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and London, at the beginning of May;
9. The *IFML* was particularly interested in the latest position put forward by Fayez al-Serraj and the vice-president of the Presidential Council, **Ahmed Maiteeq** (after his last tour of Washington, London and Rome) **to break the deadlock in Libya, throughout this new peace initiative.** The proposal includes a national peace forum and a national reconciliation authority with the mandate to extend amnesty to everyone except, obviously, those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and especially individuals that are **already under UN sanctions, including certain militia leaders.** That reconciliation process should be followed by

simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections that should take place before the end of 2019.

10. **The military confrontation continuing between the GNA and the LNA allows Islamic State (IS) cells to regain positions in areas where they have been defeated during 2015-2017 by the parallel offensives of LNA and Misrata militias against IS fighters in Sirte, Derna and Benghazi.** At the time, more or less 5000 IS insurgents were active in Libya, of whom approximately 2500 were of Tunisian origin. **The revival of terrorism is still a major threat: five significant attacks were reported until April 2019.**
11. **This situation led to an intensification of the international counter-terrorism cooperation, in synergy with both the GNA and LNA.** Of particular concern is the danger of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation, as it is feared that 15 million arms could make their way on the broader region, **fuelling terrorist activity in the Sahel region, as well as Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria.** As evidenced by the attack against *Ben Gardane* in March 2016, which almost fell into the hands of Tunisian IS fighters who crossed the nearby border between Libya and Tunisia, the danger at hand is not merely theoretical. The threat is also evidenced by the death of 37 people since 2013 in Algeria, due to a persistent pattern of hostage-taking along the 982-km long border region.
12. **The humanitarian situation of the nearly 800 000 sub-Saharan migrants coming still stuck in Libya is dire. Only 5% of this population live in the 40-45 detention camps spread across the country, while the rest are surviving in hand-to-mouth conditions in the streets.** Our Libyan hosts echoed the view expressed by the President of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made during the 31st AU Summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania (July 2018), that **UNHCR and IOM migrant return programmes** had an insignificant impact in 2018, facilitating the return of some **21 000 (in 2018).** However, **in 2019, only 3000 have participated in the return these programs.** According to data released by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), of the 115 000 migrants that crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 2018, **22 371 travelled via Libya heading for Italy and Malta,** of whom at least 2262 died.
13. The EU's **European Border and Coast Guard Agency** (Frontex) must, therefore, continue its persistent efforts to contribute to the sustainability of an effective Libyan migration management capacity, both operationally and financially. But more needs to be done to support the 315-person force, not least to expand its budget beyond the modest annual budget of just €250 million per year. Putting the challenge Frontex faces in context, it should be noted that Interpol estimated the 2017 profits from human trafficking in the region in the region of €4,5bn.
14. Since February 2019, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar has launched a military offensive against the **southern part of Libya (Fezzan)** around the city of Sebha. This military operation that is under the umbrella of his ongoing 2014 "*Dignity operation*," raising the same concerns with the "*Liberation of Tripoli operation*" **campaign against the GNA government launched on April 4.** Clearly, there is a need to pay closer attention to the humanitarian situation in this oil-rich region. In particular, attention should focus on the complications arising from the region's ethnic and tribal diversity, notably the population of 52 000 **Tebus** living in Libya, ethnically linked to the 125

000 Nigerian Tebus of the Bilma region, as well as the 375 000 residing in Chad's Tibesti region. This focus on tribal issues also concerns the **Touareg** living in the South-West of Libya, in the vicinity of the borders with Algeria and Niger, and the city of Ghadames.

- 15. The economic dimension of the conflict is also significant.** Oil and gas resources are both seen as potential spoils of war or as a motivating factor for the relaunch of negotiations. It should be recalled that in September 2016 the LNA launched a massive military offensive targeting the Petroleum Facilities Guard, under the authority of Ibrahim Jadhran, with the objective of taking control over oil production and refineries. This offensive fuelled the second so-called "*Oil Crescent offensive*" (14-26 June 2018) in the *Ras Lanuf* and *Al-Sedra* region, on the central part of the shore of the Gulf of Sirte, where the oil facilities of *Brega* and *Ajdabiya* lie. **It should also be recalled that Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) exploits some 1,2 mbpd, contributing up to 93% of Libya's GDP!**
16. During the last meeting that took place between the Head of the Presidential Council, Fayeza al-Serraj and Field Marshal, Khalifa Haftar, in Abu Dhabi, in February 2019, alongside the SRS/GUN, Ghassan Salamé, **the discussion revolved around the issue of financial retrocession between the two parties.** One of the areas of contention was the Oil field of *El-Sharara* in the Murzuq Desert, concerning the extraction of the 350, 000 barrels out of the 1,2 to 1,5 million annual Libyan production. It should be recalled that 65% of the State Budget of Libya is earmarked for the payment of salaries of the civil service, which includes the public administration services operating in the eastern part of the country. **Therefore, oil revenue provides a solid foundation for politically inclusive intra-Libyan negotiations.**

# **Consultations' Agenda of the International Fact-finding Mission to Libya (IFML)**

ARRIVAL: Saturday, 08 -06-2019, 21:55

## **Meetings scheduled for Sunday 09-06-2019**

Sunday Tripoli Radisson Blue Hotel (Nesma Hall)

08:00-09:45 Mayors of principal Libyan cities

09:45-10:45 Representatives of political parties Radisson Blue Hotel (Khaima Hall)

11:00-13:00 Civil Society Organizations

Departure to Janzour

Meeting at the UN Mission's Headquarters: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya Ghassan Salame

14:00-15:00 Tripoli Roubian Restaurant

16:00 Luncheon in the honour of the IFML Tripoli

17:30-21:00 Field trip to the affected locations

## **Meetings scheduled for Monday 10-06-2019**

Monday Tripoli Radisson Blue Hotel

08:30-09:15 Head of the High Council of State Presidential Council

Departure to the GNA Headquarters

10:00-11:00 Meeting with the President of the GNA

12:00-12:30 Press Conference (Radisson Blue Hotel)

13:30 Departure Meitiga Airport

# Meetings of the IFML with Representatives of Political Parties and Libyan Municipalities

## Meeting with Representatives from Political Parties

*Meetings with politicians from local government highlighted the suffering of many, with several democratically elected officials living in exile. The following are indicative statements made during these meetings that do not necessarily reflect the assessment of the IFML*

**Alwatan Party:** “The LNA was not an army but a collection of tribal groups which included remnants of Gaddafi brigades. The current war was one between those who were fighting for democracy and those in favour of military power. A helicopter crash off Ras Lanuf indicated French military experts were on board.”.

**Tarjier (Change) Party:** “An international investigation was expected to investigate Khalifa Haftar for conducting war crimes ”.

**National Front Party:** “The international community has lost much credibility for supporting Khalifa Haftar, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt ”.

**Justice and Development Party:**“ In eastern Libya, freedom of expression does not exist. France was caught supporting KH when experts were intercepted crossing Libya-Tunisian frontier.”

**Coalition of National Unity:** “The campaign is one which goes beyond national borders and is being funded by ruling families in the Gulf States, who are annoyed that democracy is progressing in Libya.”

**Justice and Construction Party:** “It is the GNA’s responsibility to fight terrorism, not KH. Even if KH was fighting terrorism, it was not legitimate.”

**National Forces Alliance:** “The UN mission is expected to negotiate a cease-fire agreement with the insertion of a ‘blue’ buffer zone.”

## Meeting with Municipality Mayors

*These statements do not engage in any case the IFML*

**Derna:**“ The city had high hopes for democracy after pushing out Daesh fighters, but the population had since been displaced, and the old city was destroyed. The surviving citizens refrained from speaking up, out of fear of retribution and imprisonment by authorities ”.

**Abu Salim:**“ This Tripoli municipality was hit by missiles damaging parliament and medical storage facilities (both damaged locations witnessed by the delegation). There were now five centres hosting internally displaced persons, each hosting 400 persons ”.

**Tripoli Inner City:**“ The city had a population of 2.5 million, including 0.5 million IDPs. Garbage was now accumulating all over the city (witnessed by delegation) because Khalifa Haftar controlled the rubbish dumps ”.

**Gharian:**“ Ironic how several western capitals welcomed Khalifa Haftar when Tripoli expected the EU to work with Khalifa Haftar ”.

**Benghazi:**“ The city faced five years of conflict, suffering between 10,000 to 15,000 casualties, and destroying much of the ancient city in the process. The infrastructure had collapsed to the extent that newborn babies were not being registered. The looting which happened in Benghazi did not happen during the 17 February Revolution but following the KH siege on the city ”.

**Misrata:**“ Forces from the city won over terrorist forces in Sirte so they could not be accused of being terrorists. KH must abide by the Skhirat political accord ”.

## Composition of the IFML

*The members of the IFML did not represent any institution, participating in the mission as individuals.*

Name	Relevant Title	Country
Emmanuel Dupuy	Mission Leader President - Institut Prospective et Sécurité Europe – IPSE	France
Sameh Habeeb	Mission Project Coordinator, President - ICRD	United Kingdom
Ioannis Mouzalas	Former Minister of Migration Policy	Greece
James Moran	Former EU Senior Coordinator to Libya. Associate Senior Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)	United Kingdom
Aymeri de Montesquiou Fezensac	Former Senator and former MEP	France
Khalid Chaouki	Former MP for Partito Democratico (PD)	Italy
Martin Cauchi Inglott	Colonel, Secretary General Partitu Demokratiku, former Head of Division International Military Engagement, EU Military Staff (2012 – 2015), Commander Armed Forces of Malta Maritime Squadron (2001-2008), FRONTEX Mission Commander, Central Mediterranean (2005-2006).	Malta
Jean-Paul Fabri	Former Chief Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister of Malta (2008-2013), Economic Advisor to the Central Bank Governor (2013-2015), Technical expert on governance and resilience, The Commonwealth Secretariat 2013-2016.	Malta

Sarina Klaumann	Member of the Executive Committee, Enhedslisten Party	Denmark
Kádár Barnabás	International Relations, Spokesperson, Momentum Party	Hungary
Quentin Delarue	Assistant, Member of the European Parliament Patricia Lalonde, ALDE Group	France
Barah Mikail	Director of Stractegia, Madrid	France/Spain
Leslie Varenne	Analyst, Director of IVERIS	France
Arturo Varvelli	(Researcher on Libya, Istituto Studi sulla Politica Internazionale – ISPI,	Italy
Andrea Trentini	Sant’Egidio	Italy
Felipe Duarte	Assistant professor at the Higher Institute of Police Sciences, Internal Security. Fellow at the Oxford University, Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Program of the CSIS, Washington.	Portugal
Stella Athanasoulia	Senior Researcher, ICRD, London, former BBC Foreign Affairs Analyst, Sciences Po	Greece
J drzej Winięcki	Journalist, Polityka Weekly Newspaper	Poland
Agnieszka Elzbieta Rakoczy	Journalist, Polish State Radio, PAP, Polish State Radio	Poland
Orestis Tringides	Radio Producer (Radio Mayis), Cyprus Community Media Centre	Cyprus
Romain Mielarcek	Journalist for Bruxelles 2, Brussels	France
Frederik Geldof	Journalist, Muslim Post, Tunis	France
Vörös Szabolcs Válasz	Válasz Online Budapest	Hungary
Nicolas Pelham	The Economist, Middle East Correspondent	UK
Roger McShane	The Economist, Middle East Editor	US
Sara Firth	Journalist, TRT world	UK
Suad Fazlic	TRT World	Bosnia Herzegovina
Elif Bininci	Daily Sabah	Turkey
Pelle Lykkebo	The Danish Broadcasting Corporation – DR (freelancer)	Denmark

## Press Coverage of the Mission to Date

*The positions and statements included hereafter represent only the views of the authors.*



### Emmanuel Dupuy

- <https://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/3574431/libye--pourquoi-les-demandes-de-cessez-le-feu-ne-peuvent-que-jouer-en-faveur-du-marechal-haftar-en-empechant-toute-vraie-negociation-de-paix-emmanuel-dupuy>
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### BarahMikaïl

- Middle East Eye : Qui est responsable du chaos libyen ?

<https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinion-fr/qui-est-responsable-du-chaos-libyen?fbclid=IwAR1Qa5DWlxMBpRdTlasZ3iIX0wTABfxNRLIBRL3schImWjfNPaQTKV7j98>



### Arturo Varvelli

- <https://www.ispionline.it/it/publicazione/partire-dalle-risorse-un-modello-la-risoluzione-del-conflitto-libia-23446>



### Ambassador James Moran

- CEPS: Stalemate in Libya, <https://www.ceps.eu/stalemate-in-libya/>



### Felipe Pathé Duarte

Analysis of the situation on the ground on RTP (Portugal Radio Television)

- <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p5289/e411957/jornal2?fbclid=IwAR0hkG9glxcgKIAqIxJgVgPXmfPVL-CqU0qjdP5vfiWxBViNciUnAa5k32k>
- <https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3927/e412027/1820/750188?fbclid=IwAR3atffKW1y3pc2JVio5wMupjW6U-3CZFykDpnwtgEb1h6dCPgVvHJxoTcg>

### **Publications by journalists following the group and**



- Turkey

<https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2019/06/22/post-gadhafi-libya-crippled-bycontinuous-clashes-political-instability>



- Hungary

<https://www.valaszonline.hu/2019/06/14/libia-tripoli-riport/>



- Cyprus

<https://soundcloud.com/politis1076/22-43>. (1h26m to the end).

Delegation Arrival to Tripoli on 8th of June 2019



First meeting with representatives of Local Councillors and Mayors.



Delegates meet with the local and International Press




A second meeting of an open discussion with political parties on the current political turmoil and possible solutions.



Discussion between our delegation and Head of the Libyan High Council of State Khalid al-Meshri



Delegation meeting with Fayez al-Sarraj Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya



An Open Discussion with Tunsian MPs at the Tunsian Parliament to discuss Political situation in Libya.



Meeting with National Security Advisor for Tunsian President Kamal Akrouf. Discussion was held to discuss situation in Libya and impact on Tunis.



## **ANNEX**

## OBSERVATIONS ON MIGRATION CONTROL THROUGH LIBYA

*Colonel Martin Martin Cauchi Inglott<sup>3</sup>*

Migration was high on the agenda for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) up until 4 April 2019, when Khalifa Haftar decided to move from political dialogue to military intervention, to take Tripoli. And today there are an estimated 800,000 migrants living in Libya, most of which are stranded and living under bridges, while 3% of the total number detained are in government centres.

On the positive side, women and children have now been separated from men in detention centres, the food supply has improved, and the Ministry of Health has a department which is focusing on migrants' well-being. But conditions remain crowded for some 15,000 migrants, and though detention centres are legal and under government control, traffickers are known to 'store' migrants in warehouses, in inhumane conditions.

The UN's International Office for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were supporting the GNA in repatriating migrants voluntarily up until Khalifa Haftar's intervention, with some 21,000 migrants being returned in 2018, but only 3,000 this year, as the UN had to re-focus its efforts to evacuating migrants from areas close to the military conflict.

The belief that chaos in Tripoli could result in many more outbound refugees is real, as the GNA is compelled to refocus its political and security efforts to addressing the military confrontation on the outskirts of Tripoli. Meanwhile, migration is being used as a tool by Khalifa Haftar, who is allegedly cooperating with human traffickers.

Flows of migrants from West Africa had decreased dramatically as it is now more evident that crossing the Libyan Sahara, the Tripolitania region and the Mediterranean is dangerous and difficult. Malta and Italy are the prime supporters of Libya in terms of combating illegal immigration, but lack of personnel and equipment to control borders poses challenges, the main problem not being detention centres, but countries of origin. Dutch, UK and Italian efforts to place major traffickers under sanctions is also believed to have helped reduce migration flows.

There is a familiar feeling, at all levels of government and civil society, that the international community has abandoned Libya post-Gaddafi, and more attention is being paid to African migrants than Libyan internally displaced persons, who amount to approximately 90,000 persons in Tripoli post 4 April 2019, an equal amount seeking refuge in Tunisia.

Libya is expecting Europe to work as a team with Libya to deal with this phenomenon.

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<sup>3</sup>Colonel Martin Cauchi Inglott was until recently the Secretary General Partit Demokratiku. He has served as Head of Division International Military Engagement, EU Military Staff (2012–2015), Military Representative to the EU and NATO Military Committees (2008–2012), Commander Armed Forces of Malta Maritime Squadron (2001–2008), and FRONTEX Mission Commander, Central Mediterranean (2006–2009).

# LIBYA MISSION

Tripoli June 2019

Felipe Pathé Duarte<sup>4</sup>

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The current situation is getting increasingly dangerous as a civil war is raging around the capital. The political and military standoff opens the doors to jihadi groups and may foster radicalisation processes in some social margins. The risk of the country falling into a broader civil war could create a vacuum that jihadi militants would exploit to re-emerge after their defeat in 2016. Violent extremism, terrorism and chaos are contagious and could affect the neighbouring countries and the Euro-Mediterranean south flank.

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## 1. Libyan Jihadization:

The GNA militias and the LNA forces accuse each other of supporting jihadi groups, including *al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State (IS or *Daesh*). Nevertheless, when Haftar started the armed action in Benghazi and moved into Derna, his main argument for the international community was the fight against IS influence.

Local officials and Tripoli-based authorities representing the GNA have accused Haftar of supporting and argue that their forces in Derna have repelled them.

Also, the UN officials (Ghassan Salame) confirmed that there was clear evidence of IS presence in Libya.

IS still numbers about 800-1,000 Jihadists, mainly in southern Libya, and is conducting a low-level terrorist campaign with occasional spectacular attacks.

The *al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) uses southwestern Libya as a haven. Both IS, and AQIM operates from Libya throughout the region, representing a threat for neighbouring countries.

Tunisian groups, such as the *Okba Ibn Nafaa*, *Ansar al-Sharia*, AQIM and IS have close links with their counterparts in Libya. Many of them were trained in Libyan terror camps or returned home via Libya from the battlefields in Syria and Iraq. Weapons and other supplies are smuggled into Tunisia.

Through its low-level attacks on Libyan forces and local infrastructure, the jihadi groups may use a war of attrition to prevent any future progress in Libyan state-building.

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## 2. Radicalisation and political violence:

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<sup>4</sup>**Felipe Pathé Duarte** is assistant professor at the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security. Felipe was a visiting fellow at the Oxford University (St. Antony's College) and at the Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington DC. Felipe integrates the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues, and is co-chair (for education & training) of the European Cyber Security Organization. Felipe is also researcher and invited lecturer at the CEPOL, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, for Counter-Terrorism and Counter Violent Extremism.

Most of the Libyan population opposes to jihadism and terrorism and supports a centralised Libyan government. Unlike *Daesh* recruiting efforts in Iraq and Syria, where the group has benefited from Sunni-Shiite rivalries, the Libyan power struggle exists among Libya-based Sunni Islamist groups, pro-government factions and jihadi sympathisers.

However, Libya's southern desert areas are particularly vulnerable to jihadi re-emergence. It is a lawless environment. The vast territory has also served as a safe haven for AQIM, *Boko Haram*, and the opposition fighters from Chad, Mali and Sudan.

Misrata is a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood. Tripoli is controlled by four larger militias, two of them Islamist/jihadis, who are deeply involved in criminal businesses and in blackmailing the GNA.

Serraj and his government have been losing influence on the ground in Tripoli. Networks of competing for Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, various Salafists and the formerly *al-Qaida*-associated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, influence the background, including on the GNA.

They also provide a fertile ground for radicalisation and the recruitment of terrorists.

Jihadism seems to represent a branding technique to gain legitimacy, providing identity and some material benefits. However, the economic cause appears to be not persuasive, especially since other armed groups (organised crime) in the region act in impunity.

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## **Partire dalle risorse: un modello per la risoluzione del conflitto in Libia**

Arturo Vervelli, Chiara Lovotti

04 luglio 2019

L'attuale confronto militare in Libia ha cause profonde di natura interna, regionale e internazionale. L'attacco alla capitale il 4 aprile da parte del Libyan National Army (LNA) di Khalifa Haftar ha reso evidente **il fallimento della mediazione internazionale**. Difficile pensare che i tempi per un ritorno al tavolo negoziale siano maturi. Le parti in conflitto restano infatti convinte di poter ottenere la vittoria militare. In particolare, le recentiazioni di Haftar sembrano prospettare **recrudescenze e danni materiali** in pericolosa crescita. Se la comunità internazionale vuol riaprire prospettive di negoziazione, dovrà necessariamente partire da presupposti differenti. La redistribuzione degli introiti energetici (petrolio e gas), ad esempio, in una prospettiva di medio-lungo termine, potrebbe favorire un *rapprochement* tra le componenti in conflitto a livello locale, stemperando al contempo gli attriti delle **potenze esterne** (regionali e internazionali) che le sostengono.

### ***L'attuale confronto militare***

L'attuale confronto militare in Libia sembra destinato a protrarsi. L'azione del Generale Khalifa Haftar e della formazione da lui guidata, il Libyan National Army (LNA), iniziata il 4 aprile scorso, non ha sortito l'effetto sperato, ossia quello di **una rapida presa di Tripoli**, e non sembra in grado di portare risultati almeno nell'immediato futuro, nonostante l'intensificarsi di bombardamenti dell'LNA su Tripoli all'inizio di luglio. Le milizie della capitale hanno dapprima opposto resistenza, prendendo tempo per organizzarsi e coordinarsi; poi, e soprattutto nelle ultime settimane, hanno iniziato a contrattaccare, riportando risultati positivi a Gharyan, uno dei due avamposti vicini a Tripoli, e a Tarhouna, che erano sotto il controllo delle forze di Haftar.

Il fallimento militare del generale, sul quale tuttavia non si può ancora dire l'ultima parola, pare aver riequilibrato le relazioni di forza tra il Governo di unità nazionale (GNA), guidato da Fayezi al-Serraj e Haftar stesso, il quale, prima della recente avventura militare, appariva il **nuovo leader emergente della Libia**. Basti pensare al meeting dello scorso febbraio ad Abu Dhabi, quando Haftar sembrava aver capitalizzato l'appoggio internazionale ricevuto nel corso degli ultimi anni; dall'incontro non era scaturito un vero accordo, ma certamente un *understanding* che gli avrebbe permesso di ricoprire **un ruolo di grande peso nel futuro del paese**, probabilmente assumendo la direzione delle forze armate all'interno di un governo civile. Tuttavia, con l'approssimarsi dell'incontro di Ghadames che avrebbe sancito questo ruolo, Haftar ha deciso per **l'opzione militare**, nel calcolo – sbagliato – di riuscire a prendere il controllo dell'intero paese senza fare alcuna concessione.

In questa situazione, l'invio speciale delle Nazioni Unite Ghassan Salamè sta cercando di fare percepire alle due parti contendenti **rischi di un conflitto prolungato**. Fra questi, preoccupa particolarmente la possibilità di una escalation regionale, dato il supporto di sponsor esterni che nelle ultime settimane hanno fornito armamenti sempre più sofisticati (come idroni) e mercenari alle rispettive parti in conflitto, anche per fronteggiare un reale problema di carenza di combattenti: il confronto vedrebbe infatti la nazionalità negli scontri di appena un migliaio di miliziani per parte. Allo stato attuale resterebbe però molto difficile pensare di ottenere **un cessate il fuoco in tempi rapidi**: entrambe le parti sono ancora convinte di poter ottenere una vittoria sul campo. La presa di Gharyan da parte delle forze vicine al GNA non favorisce questa soluzione, in quanto ora queste milizie potrebbero accettare una tregua solo nel caso che questa preveda il ripiegamento delle forze di Haftar alle posizioni precedenti inizio aprile, ossia **un pieno ritiro dalla Tripolitania**, respingendo una

soluzione che stabilizzerebbe l'LN A attorno a Tripoli. Tra i maggiori vincitori della situazione attuale vi sono poi le **milizie di Misurata**, tra le più numerose e meglio armate del paese, e quelle amazigh provenienti da Zintan, che hanno dato un notevole contributo a respingere Haftar entrando nella capitale e opponendosi al momento opportuno.

Il GNA di Serraj è apparso rivitalizzato dall'azione di Haftar, che pare aver perso gran parte del consenso che si stava guadagnando – anche nella capitale – a causa della **pessima gestione della cosa pubblica** da parte del governo voluto dalle Nazioni Unite e dell'imperversare delle milizie della capitale. Ciò ha permesso al ministro dell'Interno Fatih Bashaga, misuratino, di accrescere il suo **ruolo di difensore dell'ordine**, anche se appare ancora molto lontana e complicata una assimilazione delle milizie pro-GNA in qualcosa di più simile a un esercito. Serraj ha lanciato a metà giugno una iniziativa di dialogo per sbloccare la crisi libica, un "forum libico" da tenere "in coordinamento con la missione delle Nazioni Unite" in Libia, in cui dovrebbero essere rappresentate "tutte le forze [libiche] che abbiano un'influenza politica e sociale e chiedano una soluzione pacifica e democratica" con il compito di stabilire una "roadmap" e una "base costituzionale [per] tenere elezioni presidenziali e parlamentari simultanee prima della fine del 2019". La proposta, che non menzionava mai Haftar, cercava un po' anacronisticamente di tornare al processo di dialogo ONU ripartendo dalle basi precedenti. Tuttavia aveva lo scopo principale di dimostrare come Serraj desiderasse intraprendere **un percorso di pace**, al contrario del suo contendente.

Haftar ha risposto tardivamente ribadendo la sua posizione, ossia che le operazioni militari si interromperanno solamente quando l'LN A avrà raggiunto i suoi obiettivi e la necessità di sciogliere tutte le milizie e tutti gli organismi politici creati dall'Accordo politico libico (LPA). Tuttavia, Haftar ha poi lasciato spazio ad ambiguità dichiarando che nella fase di transizione, una volta che gli obiettivi della LN A fossero stati raggiunti, si potrebbe formare **un governo di unità nazionale**, magari non basato a Tripoli.

Un conflitto a tre livelli

Il conflitto attualmente sembra giocare su **tre livelli diversi**. Il primo, sin qui descritto, è quello che coinvolge gli attori locali, divisi tra est (Haftar e parlamento di Tobruk) e ovest (nelle sue più variegate componenti) del paese; il secondo è quello relativo agli attori regionali, sempre più attivi nel **sorreggere una parte o l'altra**, in particolare Emirati Arabi Uniti e Egitto contro Turchia e Qatar; e infine, il terzo è quello relativo agli attori esterni, ma parzialmente influenti nel conflitto, come **Stati Uniti, Russia, Francia e Italia**.

Dalle ultime prove disponibili, il coinvolgimento degli attori regionali, anche dal punto di vista militare, è sempre più considerevole, tanto che il conflitto sembra sta assumendo sempre più connotati di **una guerra per procura** tra gli attori regionali. Non senza una importante dose di spregiudicatezza, questi attori stanno fornendo di armi sofisticate le due fazioni contendenti, mentre la presenza di mercenari sembra supplire alla carenza di mano d'opera militare<sup>[1]</sup>. Le motivazioni che spingono a questo confronto regionale sono diverse: da una legittima ricerca di sicurezza, alle ambizioni geopolitiche, sino al confronto ideologico pro o contro Fratellanza musulmana che caratterizza lo scontro tra le due parti<sup>[2]</sup>.

Nel frattempo, però, per gli attori internazionali fuoridalla regione pare invece si sia aperta una **fase di riflessione** sulle proprie posizioni nella crisi. L'avventurismo militare di Haftar non sembra esser stato gradito da diversi interlocutori del Generale. La chiamata del presidente americano Donald Trump ad Haftar poco dopo che le sue forze avevano lanciato l'assalto a Tripoli ha creato confusione sulla **politica degli Stati Uniti nei confronti della Libia**, ed è stata letta da molti come una tacita approvazione della Casa Bianca all'offensiva. Tuttavia, la

nomina di Richard Norland come Ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti in Libia e il chiaro sostegno di quest'ultima a un cessate il fuoco sembrano indicare che sta emergendo una posizione americana più chiara e più vicina al percorso voluto dalle Nazioni Unite, anche se rimangono **forti ambiguità** emerse anche nella posizione americana al Consiglio di Sicurezza ONU al momento di prendere una decisione sulla condanna di Haftar dopo l'attacco a un centro per migranti a inizio luglio<sup>[3]</sup>. Anche i russi, che nel recente passato hanno appoggiato Haftar politicamente e quasi sicuramente gli hanno anche offerto un supporto militare, ora sembrano piuttosto **prendere le distanze**. Di fronte all'offensiva del Generale Haftar contro Tripoli, che probabilmente nemmeno la stessa Mosca si aspettava, e dinanzi ai molteplici rischi che questa comportava, la posizione ufficiale russa è però cambiata: il ministro degli Esteri Sergey Lavrov ha fatto un passo indietro, chiarendo che l'ago della bilancia di Mosca non pende dalla parte di Haftar, ma che **il Cremlino dialoga e continuerà a dialogare con tutte le parti del conflitto**<sup>[4]</sup>. Successivamente Lev Dengov, a capo del gruppo di contatto russo sulla Libia, ha affidato al sito *Sputnik* un parere piuttosto negativo sull'intera operazione di Haftar, definendo "illogico" posticipare il ritorno al dialogo a dopo la conquista di Tripoli<sup>[5]</sup>. Anche la Francia di Emmanuel Macron, che è stata fondamentale nel dare un ruolo politico a Haftar a livello internazionale mettendosullo stesso piano politico il generale e il GNA, pare abbia **raffreddato le proprie pulsioni pro-Haftar**. La trasformazione di Haftar da attore militare a uomo politico rappresentante a livello internazionale degli interessi della Cirenaica è sostanzialmente fallita assieme all'azione militare rapida e con la rinuncia alla mediazione del generale stesso. L'Italia nell'ultimo anno e mezzo si era spostata dal sostegno a Serraj verso l'apertura nei confronti di Haftar (uno "shift" sancito nella conferenza di Palermo del novembre scorso). Dopo l'offensiva militare di aprile Roma ha invece tentennato. Dapprima ha preso tempo, poi, dopo il mancato ingresso di Haftar nella capitale, ha finito sostanzialmente per **congelare la propria posizione**, ribadendo i legami con il GNA e con Misurata ma allo stesso tempo conservando una sostanziale posizione di **equidistanza tra le parti** in conflitto. È proprio nell'ottica di avere un appoggio più chiaro e assertivo da parte dell'Italia che Serraj si è recato a Milano per incontrare il ministro dell'Interno Matteo Salvini il 1° luglio scorso<sup>[6]</sup>.

Haftar, la Cirenaica e la redistribuzione della rendita

Alimentato quindi dal sostegno degli attori regionali, il conflitto potrebbe intensificarsi ulteriormente, causando note violenze e distruzione materiali e sofferenze umane nella capitale e nelle aree circostanti<sup>[7]</sup>. Il bombardamento nella notte del 3 luglio, che stando a un rapporto dell'ONU ha provocato l'uccisione di più di 50 migranti in un centro di detenzione a Tajoura, sembra purtroppo **il preludio ad una nuova fase di recrudescenze**. Inoltre, il protrarsi e l'inasprirsi del conflitto potrebbe anche destabilizzare la Libia orientale, la base di Haftar, dove i leader tribalisti stanno iniziando a esprimere malcontento per una guerra, quella nella capitale, che considerano superflua<sup>[8]</sup>. Il legame tra Haftar e questa realtà è un punto rilevante per comprendere e analizzare **possibili soluzioni all'attuale crisi**. Haftar è stato capace negli ultimi anni di federare gli obiettivi internazionali con quelli locali, trasformandosi nel garante degli interessi degli attori regionali e delle **componenti politiche, sociali e tribali della Cirenaica**. È normale che parte del gioco che coinvolge attori interni ed esterni giri attorno al controllo delle risorse. A questa evidenza però non è corrisposta una sufficiente rappresentatività del problema al momento delle negoziazioni. Le prese di posizione da parte delle istituzioni internazionali, e in particolare delle Nazioni Unite, comprese le sanzioni che impongono l'unitarietà delle istituzioni economico-finanziarie libiche, **non**

**sonor risultati sufficienti a evitare la divisione delle stesse.** Le recentiazioni militari di Haftar, che controlla molta parte dei pozzi e delle infrastrutture petrolifere nell'est e nel sud del paese, ma non può gestire gli introiti, hanno molto a che fare con il tentativo di ottenere da parte della Cirenaica parte dei proventi degli idrocarburi. Almeno in parte, infatti, l'escalation militare che la Libia ha vissuto negli ultimi mesi è legata a una **profonda crisi finanziaria** che da ormai quattro anni – cioè da quando il paese si è diviso nelle due fazioni che oggi si scontrano – vede la Banca centrale di Tripoli separata dalla sua branca orientale. È plausibile che la situazione di marginalità finanziaria in cui ha versato l'est del paese, e il desiderio di mettere mano sulla Banca centrale, siano state fra le motivazioni che hanno spinto Haftar all'offensiva militare<sup>[9]</sup>. Haftar aveva già in passato tentato, senza successo, di affidare alla Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) di Bengasi i diritti di vendita degli idrocarburi degli impianti da lui controllati. In questo contesto, sembra evidente come una soluzione della crisi libica passi necessariamente per **un ripensamento dei meccanismi di redistribuzione** della rendita all'interno della molteplicità degli attori libici (municipalità, regioni, minoranze, ecc.), che finora non è stato sufficientemente discusso. Ciò rappresenta quindi **un forte limite a qualsiasi negoziazione**. Gli eventi seguenti al 2011 sembrano dimostrare che il sentimento di unità nazionale è ancora molto fragile e che il regionalismo si è immerso con una spaccatura *de facto* tra est e ovest del paese che ha preso nel corso degli ultimi 8 anni forme diverse ma non si è mai risolta. La richiesta di autonomia della Cirenaica, regione che possiede **il 30% della popolazione del paese ma circa il 60% delle riserve petrolifere**, insieme con la disparità e la disuguaglianza economica tra la Cirenaica, storicamente maltrattata dal governo centrale, e la Tripolitania, ha costituito una delle motivazioni principali dell'ascesa di Haftar.

Il modello curdo-iracheno per la crisi libica?

La profonda spaccatura che vive oggi la Libia non rappresenta certo un elemento di originalità e unicità né all'interno del contesto mediorientale né fra le economie dei *rentier state*. Pur con tutte le differenze del caso, un modello che potrebbe offrire una utile chiave di lettura della crisi libica potrebbe essere quello **curdo-iracheno**. Nel 2005, una nuova costituzione, redatta dopo un difficile percorso elettorale, ha sancito ufficialmente l'autonomia del Kurdistan iracheno (Articolo 140)<sup>[10]</sup>, garantendo ad Erbil (capoluogo della regione curda) **un notevole grado di libertà politica ed economica** rispetto al governo federale di Baghdad. Fin da subito una delle questioni principali nel regolare i rapporti di potere tra le due parti è stata quella dello sfruttamento delle risorse naturali, e in particolare dei giacimenti petroliferi, fonte di reddito essenziale per lo stato rentier. Con la "Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region" (2007) si è stabilito che il governo regionale gestisca le attività di estrazione in accordo e in collaborazione con il governo federale, e che tutti i proventi del petrolio estratto dalla regione curda vengano riversati in un fondo generale iracheno per la rendita del petrolio (Articolo 18). La stessa legge prevede poi che una commissione nazionale congiunta<sup>[11]</sup>, e monitorata da una istituzione finanziaria internazionale, riconosca al governo regionale una parte dei proventi (Articolo 19)<sup>[12]</sup>. Le tensioni con Baghdad, però, non sono mancate e hanno portato a **successive modifiche dei patti**. Tuttavia, nonostante le difficoltà e le dispute ancora in corso, questo modello di ripartizione della rendita sembra aver dato **una qualche forma di stabilità** al paese<sup>[13]</sup>. Applicando questo schema di ragionamento alla Libia, si potrebbe pensare di proporre **un modello di soluzione dell'attuale crisi** che comprenda la concessione di una percentuale delle entrate petrolifere alla Cirenaica.

Secondo il modello iracheno, per esempio, ogni anno una parte del budget federale (che sinistre quasi integralmente delle rendite petrolifere) deve essere stanziata a favore del governo regionale curdo. L'ammontare di questacifra viene calcolato in

**rapporto alla percentuale della popolazione** curda; a partire dal 2003, ad esempio, la quota destinata ad Erbil si è attestata al 17%, mentre a partire dal 2017 è scesa al 13%, in linea con la proporzionedemograficacurda in calonepaese. Se si destinasse una quota fissadelleentrateallasuccursalebengasinadella banca centrale, attorno al 30% per esempio, in base allapercentuale di popolazione della Cirenaica, si potrebbe patteggiare con le *constituencies* dell'est **un cessateil fuoco duraturo**, un ritorno dell'LNA all'interno dei confini della Cirenaica o precedentiall'azione militare del 4 aprile e, in prospettiva, anche una sostituzione della leadership di Haftar. Molte delle tribù della Cirenaica, come detto, non sembrano affatto favorevoli alla continuazione di un conflitto che vedepartedeilorogiovanicom battere all'interno dell'LNA per una **sempre più inverosimile presa della capitale**.

Un sistema simile consentirebbe alla LNOC e alla Banca Centrale di Tripoli di conservare la propria centralità e **il monopolio sullo sfruttamento delle risorse**, intascando dall'estero i proventi degli idrocarburi e girandone una parte alla Cirenaica. Quest'ultima raggiungerebbe *de facto* una **autonomia di gestione dei fondi**, conserverebbe istituzioni economiche proprie e potrebbe crearsi istituzioni politiche regionali. Se il patto non fosse rispettato a causa di una violazione dell'LNA, le autorità di Tripoli potrebbero interrompere l'erogazione dei fondi a Bengasi.

Un simile modello potrebbe avererisvolti positivi su tutti e tre i livelli del conflitto sopra descritti (locale, regionale e internazionale). Potrebbe garantire gli interessi delle *constituencies* della Cirenaica e al contempo degli attori regionali, **ipotizzando un abbandono del sostegno militare a Haftar** da parte di questi ultimi, soprattutto se gli attori internazionali più influenti sapranno e vorranno prendere posizione più chiaramente ed esplicitamente contro l'escalation militare da lui cercata e il supporto esterno ricevuto. In conclusione, questa soluzione anziché definire la divisione del paese, che sostanzialmente già esiste, costituirebbe la migliore garanzia per **la conservazione dell'unità della Libia** e per una prospettiva della sua stabilizzazione.

#### Note

[1] Entrambe le fazioni coinvolte nel conflitto hanno ricevuto un cospicuo supporto in termini di armamenti da parte dei loro principali sostenitori. Da un lato, immagini non ufficialmente testimoniano come Tripoli abbia ricevuto armi leggere, veicoli blindati e persino droni di provenienza turca. Le forze armate di Haftar, invece, sono state rafforzate con APC di fabbricazione giordana, sistemi di artiglieria contraerea e armi pesanti controcarro appartenenti alle forze emiratine, oltre che a sostanziosi aiuti economici sauditi.

[2] Terek Megerisi, "[Libya's Global Civil War](#)", ECFR, June 2019

[3] "[US thwarts UN Security Council condemnation of attack on Libya migrant center](#)", Deutsche Welle, July 2019

[4] "[\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_](#)", 5-tv.ru, aprile 2019

[5] Safa Alharathy, "[Russia reaffirms political solution in Libyan crisis](#)", The Libya Observer, June 2019

[6] Vincenzo Nigro, "[Libia, Serrajincontra Salvini a Milano: "Haftar ha fallito"](#)", Repubblica, luglio 2019

[7] A fine giugno le vittime di questo nuovo conflitto ammontavano a quasi 700 mentre gli sfollati a più di 90 mila.

[8] "[Stopping the War for Tripoli](#)", International Crisis Group, May 2019

[9] “Of Tanks and Banks: Stopping a Dangerous Escalation in Libya”, International Crisis Group, May 2019

[10] The Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Interior, Iraqi Constitution, Art.117. Vale la pena notare che, legittimando l'autonomia di fatto goduta dalla regione nel decennio precedente, la Costituzione (articolo 141) riconosceva la validità delle leggi approvate dal KRG dopo il 1992.

[11] La Commissione, secondo quanto stipulato dall'articolo 19 della Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region e dall'Art. 106 della Costituzione irachena, dev'essere congiunta e composta da esperti del governo federale e dai rappresentanti delle varie unità amministrative del paese. Si vedano, rispettivamente, *ibid*; Oil And Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region – Iraq

[12] Anche grazie alla registrazione di diversi contratti di co-produzione (“Production-Sharing Contracts”, PSC) con importanti aziende straniere, fra cui ExxonMobil (2011) e Gazprom (2012), la produzione annuale di idrocarburi di Erbil è gradualmente aumentata, arrivando a contare fino al 75% del Pil regionale. Per maggiori informazioni, si veda Carlo Frappi “The Energy Factor: Oil and State-Building in Iraq-Kurdistan”, in: Stefano M. Torelli, “Kurdistan. An invisible Nation”, ISPI Report, June 2016

[13] Nel 2013, in particolare, in violazione dell'accordo, il Governore regionale curdo ha cominciato ad avviare programmi di esportazioni indipendenti dal Governo federale, che fino ad allora aveva salvaguardato il monopolio sulle esportazioni verso i mercati esteri e la conseguente distribuzione delle rendite. Passando principalmente attraverso il gasdotto turco di Ceyhan, le esportazioni indipendenti di Erbil si sono inizialmente dirette al mercato turco, per poi allargarsi. Di fronte al nuovo programma di esportazioni curde, come ritorsione Baghdad ha cominciato a pagare i salari dei dipendenti statali. Solo nel 2014 Baghdad ed Erbil hanno raggiunto un accordo secondo il quale il Kurdistan si sarebbe impegnato a destinare al budget nazionale l'equivalente della rendita di 150.000 barili al giorno (circa la metà dell'export totale). In cambio, inoltre, Baghdad avrebbe allocato fondi per un totale di 500 milioni di dollari.

